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| Objection to Dretske's "How do you know you're not a Zombie" |
| In an attempt to undermine a non-physical existence of consciousness, Dretske declares there is nothing we are aware of that tells us we are not zombies. He claims we all know we’re not zombies, but he asks how do we know? One way Dretske attempts to validate his claim that we do not know how we know we’re not zombies is to deny veridical perception as being a way we know we’re conscious (Dretske 1999). He breaks down veridical perception into a few subcategories, but the most interesting (which is the scope of this paper) is the discussion of ‘Feeling vs. Not Feeling.’
What is the difference between (1) feeling x and not feeling x compared to (2) feeling x and feeling y? Dretske claims that feeling x versus not feeling x is not a tactile difference; it’s a difference that cannot be felt. If you can feel x and you cannot feel x, then you cannot feel the difference. He then says the difference between feeling x and feeling y is a tactile difference, which means you can feel the difference between x and y (Dretske 1999). You can feel x and then you can feel y. They are both physically present, both occupying space and you can distinguish between how they both feel. I don’t necessarily agree that (1) and (2) are two completely different phenomena. It appears to me that both (1) and (2) are of the same order, i.e. both (1) and (2) are either differences you feel or differences you do not feel. Just because you think without x being physically present (or actually occupying space) there is no difference that can be felt when x is present seems to me to undermine how the physicalist would view the world. If x is there, I feel it. If x is not there, I don’t feel it. There is a difference in feeling the properties of x and the properties of feeling not x. Or conversely, just because you think you can feel the difference between x and y because they are both physically present (or actually occupying space), doesn’t mean that the difference you are noting is actually felt.
Georgalis claims that x (whatever it may be) has a particular sensation (as does y, z, etc.) and one can compare in thought the different sensations between x and y (or z, etc) and thereby determine that there is a difference in how they feel, but they do not feel different (Georgalis 2005). Now, in this context, I take sensations to be the general nomenclature of all physiological modalities (e.g. feel, see, hear, etc.) we as humans possess. Thus, according to Georgalis, when an individual sees x and sees y (simultaneously or otherwise), one can potentially note a difference in how x and y look, but one cannot actually see the difference (just as in the case if one feels x and one feels y, one cannot feel the difference).
I believe there are physical properties that objects of the physical world possess and when our (physical) bodies interact with these physical properties, there is a distinguishable difference from one object to another. Glass does feel different than sandpaper. My phenomenal experiences of touching glass and touching sandpaper (simultaneously or otherwise) tells me how they are different. But this doesn’t mean that I feel the difference. There is a difference between how the glass feels and how the sandpaper feels because of the physical properties of the glass and the physical properties of the sandpaper. But, I believe our knowledge of these differences occur in thought, whereby this difference in thought is a comparison of the mental representations of the physical properties of the objects. It takes the process of introspection of the physical properties of an object (i.e. the process of thinking “I wonder what the piece of sandpaper in front of me feels like? Well, it feels like…”) to know the differences in how this object may feel relative to another object. Thus, one can only distinguish the difference between glass and sandpaper by accessing the different sensations introspectively.
Ultimately, there is a difference between x and y, but it’s not a difference we perceive or conscious of. You can note the difference in how x and y feel as well as the difference in how x and not x feel, you just cannot feel the difference. Thus, how we come to realize the difference (intuition) between x and y or x and not x leads us to conclude we are aware there is a difference. Obviously, then, this awareness does not come from the perception itself but from the intuitive process of knowing what we perceive. Assuming this to be true, this awareness foils Dretske’s claim of using veridical perception as a means of determining we do not know we’re not zombies.
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